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STOCHASTIC UTILITY-EFFICIENT PROGRAMMING OF ORGANIC 
DAIRY FARMS 
 
 
Abstract 
Opportunities to make sequential decisions and adjust activities as a season progresses and more 
information becomes available characterise the farm management process. In this paper, we present a 
discrete stochastic two-stage utility efficient programming model of organic dairy farms, which includes 
risk aversion in the decision maker’s objective function as well as both embedded risk (stochastic 
programming with recourse) and non-embedded risk (stochastic programming without recourse). 
Historical farm accountancy data and subjective judgements were combined to assess the nature of the 
uncertainty that affects the possible consequences of the decisions. The programming model was used 
within a stochastic dominance framework to examine optimal strategies in organic dairy systems in 
Norway. 
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  2Introduction 
In stochastic programming some of the data elements incorporated into the objective function or 
constraints are uncertain (Kall and Wallace, 1994; Dupačová, 2002). Most mathematical programming 
studies including risk in agricultural economics have adopted a static framework and included risk 
aversion in the decision maker’s objective function. The most widely used techniques have been quadratic 
risk programming (Markowitz, 1952; Freund, 1956) and its linear approximations such as MOTAD 
(Hazell, 1971). For the farmer, the main issue raised by variability of price and production is how to 
respond tactically and dynamically to opportunities or threats to generate additional income or to avoid 
losses (i.e. how to respond after the outcome of a random variable is observed) (Pannell et al., 2000). 
Some studies of conventional farming systems have used stochastic programming with recourse to deal 
with this aspect (e.g., Kaiser and Apland, 1989; Kingwell, 1994; Torkamani and Hardaker, 1996; Pannell 
and Nordblom, 1998; Lien and Hardaker, 2001; Torkamani, 2005). 
Compared to conventional farming, organic farming systems are subject to different and perhaps 
higher exposure to risk due to restrictions on use of pesticides, mineral fertilizers, synthetic medicines, 
purchase of feeds and livestock, etc. Smaller organic markets may mean greater price fluctuations. But, as 
far as we know, only deterministic linear programs have been used as decision support models for organic 
farmers (e.g., Berentsen et al., 1998; Pacini et al., 2004). 
In this paper we present a stochastic utility-efficient programming model of organic dairy farms. The 
model is applied on a Norwegian case farm to examine optimal farming systems under prevailing 
economic conditions, as well as under a constructed scenario with greater farm income variability. 
Compared to previous studies, the model includes two methodological advances: 
•  An organic dairy system is modelled in a whole-farm context that includes risk aversion in the 
decision maker’s objective function as well as both embedded risk (stochastic programming with 
recourse) and non-embedded risk (stochastic programming without recourse). 
•  It illustrates how a mathematical programming model can be used within a stochastic efficiency 
framework (Hardaker et al., 2004b) to rank risky farm strategies and assess policy questions under 
risk. 
The model 
Our two-stage model incorporates both non-embedded risk and embedded risk, as outlined in Figure 
1. We assume a one-year plan starting in spring. First-stage decisions are, e.g., how many cows and 
heifers to keep, allocation of land to various crops, and the use of manure. The nature of biological 
production implies yield uncertainty. Since dairy farmers do not perceive milk yield as an important 
source of risk (Flaten et al., 2005) and because of strict rules about livestock trade in organic farming, 
possible adjustment to cow numbers etc. to match the milk quota, is not included in the model. Therefore, 
once the numbers of cows and heifers are decided, the dairy herd size is fixed. The risk associated with 
the dairy herd is thus non-embedded risk, as indicated by the upper branch of Figure 1. 
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forage 
activities
Adjust the 
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Final 
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Final 
outcomes
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Figure 1. Outline decision tree for our problem. 
 
Unstable weather and the fact that organic farmers’ use of soluble mineral fertilizers and of 
pesticides is prohibited imply crop yield uncertainty, with the actual yields being known only after 
harvest. Hence in the spring time the farmer is uncertain about the area of forage and grain needed to 
produce the necessary feed for the livestock. However, some decisions can be postponed until better 
  3information is available. Although adjustments can be made at any time, we assume for simplicity that the 
farmer will do the necessary adjustment only once during the year, in the mid of September. At that time, 
the type of crop growing season will be known, the grazing season is completed and the herd’s indoor-
season starts. The second-stage decisions allow us to model a response to the observed crop yields 
outcome. One set of second-stage (recourse) variables for each state of crop yields outcome is defined. 
Feed plans can be adjusted, depending on earlier decisions and the seasonal condition. Feedstuffs can be 
sold or purchased. Bulls can be sold or retained. The possibility to adjust the farm plan in response to 
uncertain intermediate outcomes of crop yields creates a case of embedded risk, as illustrated in the lower 
branch of Figure 1. Embedded risk is modelled using discrete stochastic programming (Cocks, 1968; Rae, 
1971). 
In a multi-stage decision problem, the later strategies need to be present in sufficient detail to ensure 
“correct” first stage decisions. Actual later stage decisions can be resolved by running further more 
refined models incorporating the outcomes of uncertain events as they unfold (Kaiser and Apland, 1989). 
With this in mind, it was decided to model forage yield uncertainty with only three outcomes and the 
same for grain yield uncertainty. 
 Farmers’ behaviour and utility 
We assume that farmers are risk-averse (or risk-neutral) and that belief and preferences vary between 
farmers. Many alternative programming models for whole-farm system planning under risk have been 
developed (Hardaker et al., 2004a: Ch. 9). For our problem we use the utility-efficient programming 
(UEP) approach (Patten at al., 1988). In UEP, any convenient form of utility function can be used. 
Because we assume that farmers usually are risk-averse, we are restricted to using any concave form of 
the utility function, i.e.,  , where z is a vector of net incomes by state. We used the negative 
exponential function: 
() 0 < ′ ′ z U
 
 
  ( ) z r U × − − = exp 1  (1)
 
 
where r is a non-negative parameter representing the coefficient of absolute risk aversion,  , and 
. This function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), which is a reasonable 
approximation to the real but unknown utility function for wealth for variations in transitory (annual) 
income (Hardaker et al., 2004b).  
() 0 > ′ z U
() 0 < ′ ′ z U
 Activities and constraints 
The main groups of activities in the model are as follows (first or second stage variables in 
parentheses): 
1.  Forage production activities: pasture and cutting areas (stage 1). Grass-clover from cutting areas is 
conserved as silage for the 255-days indoor season. For both pasture and silage areas four levels of 
manure application are distinguished (from 0 to 30 tonnes per hectare (t/ha) pasture and from 10 to 
40 t/ha silage). Forage yields respond to manure applications, but at a diminishing rate. Protein 
content is not affected.  
2.   Grain production activities (stage 1). Barley can be produced at four levels of manure application 
(from 10 to 40 t/ha). Further, the grass-clover swards are established under-sown in barley, 
distinguished by the same four levels of manure application. Grain yields respond to manure 
applications, but at a diminishing rate. Protein content is not affected. 
3.   Land and manure activities (stage 1). Land can be rented at a fixed price (NOK 1500 per ha, 
€1≈NOK 8.25). Conventionally produced cattle manure can be purchased (NOK 50 per tonne).  
4.   Forage trade and transfer activities (stage 1 and 2). Surplus grass from grazing fields can be 
conserved as silage to be used in winter-feeding. One activity for selling and one for purchasing 
silage are available in stage 2. The output of silage to provide the herd with enough forage during the 
winter period is maintained through three transfer activities, one for each of the livestock categories 
(dairy cows, heifers, bulls).  
  45.   Concentrates and grain trading activities (stage 1 and 2). Two mixtures of organic concentrate 
supplements, with different protein contents, can be purchased. In addition, one mixture of 
conventional origin is allowed. The mixtures are available in both stages. In stage 2, organic barley 
can be sold or purchased. Home-processed barley can be used as concentrate feed in stage 2.  
6.   Livestock activities: dairy cows, heifer and beef activities (stage 1 and 2). Cows calve in the middle 
of May. Livestock are given free access to forage, pasture in stage 1 and silage in stage 2. Five 
annual milk yield levels are assumed (from 4000 to 7000 kg milk per cow). Higher milk yields are 
achieved through addition of concentrates, which depress forage intake. Some heifer calves are 
raised on the farm to replace cows, while the rest are sold at a few weeks old. Heifers follow a 
standard rearing system, calving at two years age. In stage 1, bull calves can either be sold or kept 
over the grazing season. At stage 2, remaining bull calves can be sold immediately (as 4 months old) 
or be fed for a further 8 months and sold as yearlings.  
7.   Labour activities (stage 1 and 2). Activities expressing the farm family’s opportunity cost of labour 
or off-farm work are included. Provision is made to hire additional labour.  
8.  Public payment schemes (stage 1 and 2). The prevailing payment schemes (2003/2004) in Norway 
are included. The schemes are paid per livestock head or per hectare, with rates varying according to 
crops and type of livestock. Rates are highest for the first hectares and heads. Specific livestock and 
area payments offered for organic farming are included. 
Input prices and rates in the payment schemes are taken from NILF (2003). The technical responses 
and relationships build on a large number of sources. 
The main groups of constraints are as follows: 
1.   Land constraints (stage 1). A farm size close to the average of organic dairy farms in the lowlands of 
Southern Norway is assumed (25 ha). A limit is included on the amount of land that can be rented 
(15 ha).  
2.   Rotational limits (stage 1). To avoid the build-up of pests and diseases and to have a balance 
between fertility-building grass-clover leys and exploitative grains, no more than 50% of the area 
can be cropped for grain. Another constraint ensures that the ley lasts for three years (the sowing 
year excluded).  
3.   Milk quota constraint (stage 1). The farm’s annual milk quota is set at 100 000 litres. No possibilities 
to acquire additional quota are assumed. Production above the quota has no commercial value.  
4.   Manure allocation and legislation (stage 1). One constraint ensures that manure used in the crops 
cannot exceed manure produced on the farm and purchased. There are two organic manure 
legislation constraints (Debio, 2003). The total amount of manure applied on the holding cannot 
exceed 140 kg of Nitrogen per year/ha of farmland used. Of this manure, up to 80 kg of Nitrogen per 
year/ha can be conventionally produced.  
5.  Dairy herd replacement control and birth balances (stage 1). A replacement constraint ensures that 
the necessary cows will be provided through rearing replacements (30% culling rate). Two birth 
balance constraints (one per gender) require that the number of calves sold, bulls sold and heifers 
reared do not exceed the number of calves produced (one per cow per year).  
6.   Livestock housing requirement (stage 2). Each category of animal requires a minimum surface area 
for indoor housing (Debio, 2003). The herd’s use of surface area cannot exceed the capacity of the 
free-range livestock shed (230 m
2).  
7.   Livestock density (stage 2). One constraint ensures that a maximum number of livestock per ha is 
not exceeded (Debio, 2003).  
8.   Labour constraints (stage 1 and 2). On dairy farms, labour needs through the year are quite stable. 
Just one constraint on an annual basis is then adequate to ensure that labour demand does not exceed 
the supply from family and hired workers. The labour requirements of many jobs are not directly 
allocable to specific production activities (‘overhead’ labour). The constraint ‘supply of family 
labour available to production activities’ (variable labour, 1500 hours) equals total family labour 
supply (3500 hours) less overhead labour (2000 hours). The input-output coefficients for variable 
labour requirements per unit of the activities are constant, irrespective of the scale on which the 
activities are conducted.  
9.   Public payment constraints (stage 1 and 2). 
  510.  Fodder production and utilisation (stage 2). Fodder purchased and produced (revealed after stage 1) 
cannot exceed fodder sold and used in livestock production. There is one constraint for each of 
pasture, silage and barley.  
11.  Feeding requirements (stage 1 and 2). Livestock feeding requirements are specified in minimum dry 
matter limits of concentrates and pasture in stage 1, and of concentrates and silage in stage 2. 
Minimum protein requirements are specified for cows in stage 1 and for all types of livestock in 
stage 2. Sub-matrices for each type of livestock, with a repetition of the feedstuffs in each, are 
necessary to avoid possibilities for surplus nutrients being passed on from one type of animal to 
another. One constraint per livestock type ensures that a maximum of 15% of the energy content in 
the annual feed ration can be of conventional origin (Debio, 2003). 
 Specification of stochastic variables 
Many of the data requirements for stochastic models are similar to those of deterministic models. 
However, additional data are needed in stochastic models to represent uncertainty. Outlined here is how 
we specified the stochastic variables, which were income and crop yield variables. 
To represent the uncertainty in activity incomes, we mainly used the method described in Hardaker 
et al. (2004a: 80-82). We used historical data from 1993 to 2002 for organic dairy farms in the Norwegian 
Farm Accountancy Survey to estimate the historical variation in enterprise incomes per unit within farms 
between years. The Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute (NILF) collected the data. 
In the panel data used, the number of observations for each enterprise varied from 44 to 51 
observations. The number of farms was 11. We used the unbalanced panel data to find the parameters that 
describe the variation in the individual enterprise incomes per unit within farms between years. For 
activity j we estimated the following two-way fixed effects model: 
 
 
  wT T w wT e x + + + = β α µ   (2)
 
 
where xwT is deflated income per unit on farm w in year T (T=1,…,10), µ  is general mean,  w α  is the 
effect on income due to farm w,  T β  is the effect on income due to year T, and the residual   is a 
random variable with mean zero. The estimated individual activity income per unit for a representative 
farm for year T is: 
wT e
 
 
 
T T x β µ ˆ ˆ ˆ + = ⋅   (3)
 
 
We then removed from the panel data the farm-specific effects caused by different management 
practices, soil quality etc.,  w α ˆ , and unexplained white noise,  . We adjusted for trend by regressing 
the estimated   from Equation (3) against time, T, for each activity. We then added the residuals of this 
regression for each year to our predicted trend value from the regression for the planning year in order to 
construct de-trended series (row 4 and 5 in Table 1). To reflect the chance that similar conditions to those 
in each of the data years will prevail in the planning period, we assigned, for simplicity, equal 
probabilities to the historical years or ‘states of nature’ 1993 to 2002.  
wT e ˆ
T x⋅ ˆ
Both national and international developments imply that Norwegian agricultural policy will change 
in the future. In that case, historical data are not relevant in our decision model. We therefore elicited 
from an expert group of agricultural researchers the subjective marginal distributions of the individual 
activity incomes. From these experts we received judgements of the lowest, highest and most likely 
values of individual income in the future. Then, assuming that the individual subjective incomes per unit 
were approximately triangularly distributed, we calculated means and standard deviations, as shown in 
row 7 and 8 of Table 1.  
 
  6Table 1. Distribution of activity incomes in NOK (€1≈NOK 8.25) per dairy cow and per bull by state of 
nature. 
S t a t e   1  2  3  456789   1 0   M e a n S t . d e v .
Trend and inflation-corrected historical incomes: 
Probability 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Dairy  cow  19822 16967 16540 16834 16929 16975 15350 16214 17818 17328 17078 1168
Bull  6838 8364 9387  15309 9918 11023 8418 6265 9100 9480 9410 2502
Statistics from elicited subjective triangular distributions: 
Dairy  cow            15483 901
Bull             8503 404
Reconstructed incomes: 
Dairy  cow  17501 15460 15542 14822 15377 15463 14059 14860 16062 15680 15483 901
Bull  8080 8334 8509 9450 8585 8765 8343 7995 8451 8514 8503 404
 
Finally, the historical income series were reconstructed, using the formula (Hardaker et al., 2004a): 
 
 
 
() () () () () () } {
( )
() j
j
j ij j ij h
s
h x E h x s x E n x
σ
σ
− + =   (4)
 
 
where   is the synthesised income for activity j in state i,  () ij n x ( ) ( ) j s x E  is the subjective mean of the 
income of activity j,   is the corrected historical income of activity j in state i,  () ij h x () ( ) j h x E  is the mean 
income from the corrected historical data for activity j,  ( ) j s σ  is the subjective standard deviation of the 
income for activity j, and  () j h σ  is the standard deviation of the income for activity j from the corrected 
historical data. The reconstructed series (the two last rows in Table 1) have the subjectively elicited 
means and standard deviations while preserving the correlation and other stochastic dependencies 
embodied in the historical data. The reconstructed incomes used in the model were adjusted according to 
milk yields for dairy cows and stage of production for bulls. 
There may be a stochastic dependency between forage and grain production. If there is a correlation 
between forage yield per ha and grain yield per ha, this should be reflected in the joint probabilities. In 
our de-trended
1 historical panel data of organic farms (from the Norwegian Farm Accountancy Survey for 
the years 1993-2002) we found a significant within farm correlation between forage yield and grain yield 
of 0.10, implying a weak positive correlation.  
We used the same panel data to derive the within farm joint distributions of forage and grain yield. 
From the data we found the within farm standard deviation for forage yield to be 616 FUm/ha. One FUm 
(feed unit milk) is defined as 6900 kJ of net energy lactation. For each farm we calculated mean forage 
yield and added/subtracted this standard deviation times 0.5. In this way we received two farm-specific 
limits and three farm-specific forage yields intervals. The same procedure was performed for grain yields, 
that had a within farm standard deviation of 654 FUm/ha. In the next step we simply counted the numbers 
of data points in each cell to estimate the within farm joint probability distribution between forage and 
grain yields (Table 2). 
Mean values for each interval (Table 2, last row for grain, last column for forage) were calculated as 
overall means plus/minus means of deviations from farm means, if observation was in low, normal or 
high production interval. With this approach to estimate the joint probabilities we used the information 
that exists in the panel data and we accounted for the specific empirical distributions. For each type of 
crop in the model, the relative yield differences between the three states of nature in Table 2 determined 
yield distributions at the various levels of manure application. 
                                                 
1 We adjusted for trend by regressing forage yield against time for the whole sample. Then, the regression residual for each 
observation was added to the predicted forage yield for the planning year 2002. Grain yield was de-trended in the same way. 
With this approach we assumed an equal trend for every farm in the sample. An alternative approach is to de-trend individually 
for each farm. 
  7Table 2. Within farm joint probability distribution for yields, and mean yields for each interval (FUm/ha). 
 Grain  yield 
Forage yield  Low  Normal High Total  Mean yield
Low 0.068  0.182 0.045 0.295  3521
Normal 0.114  0.159 0.114 0.386  3662
High 0.068  0.136 0.114 0.318  3860
Total 0.250  0.477 0.273 1.000 
Mean yield  3117  3280 3499  
 Matrix structure 
The two-stage UEP with recourse for the case farm was formulated as follows: 
 
 
  [ ] ( ) r z U p U E st st , max 2 = , r varied,  (5)
 
subject to 
 
 
  , 1 1 1 b x A ≤   (6)
  , 9 ... 2 1 2 2 2 1 , , , s b x A x B s s s s = ≤ +    ,   (7)
           , , 10 ,..., 2 , 1 , 9 ,..., 2 , 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 = = = − + t s f z I x C x C st st st st st st   (8)
  . 9 ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 2 1 = ≥ ≥ s x x s    0,     (9)
 
 
where: 
[] U E   = expected  utility; 
pst    =  1 by s×t vector of joint probabilities of activity income per unit outcomes given that crop 
yield state of nature, s (cf. Table 2) and season state of nature, t (cf. Table 1) has occurred; 
() r z U st, 2   =  s×t by 1 vector of utilities of net income z2st, where the utility function is defined for a 
measure of risk aversion, r that is varied in the range  U L r r r ≤ ≤ ; 
z2st =  s×t by 1 vector of net income; 
A1 =  m1 by n1 matrix of technical coefficients in stage 1; 
A2s =  m2s by n2s matrix of technical coefficients in stage 2 and state s; 
x1 =  n1 by 1 vector of activity levels of first-stage decision variables, representing decisions that 
must be made before the values of uncertain parameters are observed; 
x2s =  n2s by 1 vector of activity levels of second-stage decision variables in state s, representing 
recourse actions that can be taken after given earlier stage decisions and a specific 
realization of the embedded risk parameters is observed; 
b1 =  m1 by 1 vector of resource stocks in stage 1; 
b2s =  m2s by 1 vector of resource stocks in stage 2 and state s; 
Bs  = set  of  s matrices linking first and second stage activities; 
C1st =  s×t by n1 matrix of activity incomes in stage 1; 
C2st =  s×t by n2s matrix of activity incomes in stage 2; 
fst  =  s×t by 1 vector of fixed costs; 
I2st  =  set of s×t by s×t identity matrix in stage 2. 
 
Equation (6) represents the immediate first-stage constraints, those that involve only the variables 
that cannot be delayed. Equation (7) denotes the second-stage constraints for each state of crop yields. In 
Equation (8) activity incomes of first- and second-stage decision variables are linked to the accounting of 
the final uncertain net incomes for each state of crop yields s and season t. The net incomes are 
transferred into expected utility in the non-linear objective function (Equation 5). 
  8The matrix developed comprised about 380 activities and 350 constraints. It was solved using 
GAMS/CONOPT3. Because this software does not include a parametric programming option, solutions 
were obtained for stepwise variation in r (cf. Equation 1). 
Stochastic efficiency analysis 
Hardaker et al. (1991) proposed that the efficient solution within the range   of the UEP is 
identical with the concept of stochastic dominance with respect to a function (Meyer, 1977), or the 
alternative concept stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) (Hardaker et al., 2004b). The 
general rule for SERF analysis is that the efficient set contains only those alternatives that have the 
highest expected utility (measured as certainty equivalents
2) for some value of r in the relevant range 
between   and  . In contrast to a simulation model, in an optimisation model as UEP the efficient front 
is directly obtained. The SERF procedure can, inter alia, be used to rank various policy alternatives and 
farm strategies. 
U L r r r ≤ ≤
L r U r
Anderson and Dillon (1992) proposed a classification of degrees of risk aversion, based on the 
relative risk aversion with respect to wealth  ( ) W rr  in the range 0.5 (hardly risk-averse at all) to about 4 
(very risk-averse). If the coefficient of absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth   is needed, we 
can use   (Arrow, 1965). In this paper, we do not consider utility and risk aversion in 
terms of wealth, but in terms of transitory income. Since we use a negative exponential utility function in 
terms of transitory income,  , we need a relationship between 
() W ra
() () W W r W r r a / =
z ( ) W rr  and  ( ) z ra . Assuming asset 
integration, Hardaker et al. (2004a) show that: 
 
 
  ( ) ( ) W W r z r r a =   (10)
 
 
Thus multiplying  ( ) z ra  by W  for  ( ) W rr  will yield the approximately corresponding range 
expressed in  . In this study, the typical level of a farmer’s wealth, W , was assumed to be NOK 
1 350 000. According to Equation (10) a value of 
() z ra
( ) z ra  in the range 0 to 0.000003 corresponds to  ( ) W rr  
in the range 0 to 4, which was used as the risk aversion bounds in the SERF analysis. 
Application 
 Results under prevailing economic conditions 
The model was applied for a case farm that reflects the conditions for a typical organic dairy farm in 
the lowlands of Southern Norway. The farmer owned 25 ha of land, and an additional 15 ha of land could 
be rented. The annual milk quota was 100 000 litres. 
The main results under prevailing economic conditions are first presented. Table 3 summarizes the 
main activities in stage 1 for our model by different degree of risk aversion. One important observation is 
that degree of risk aversion did not effect on optimal activity choice. The very risk-averse farmer 
( ≈4) (as well as less risk-averse farmers, not shown in Table 3) chose the same farm plan as a risk-
neutral farmer ( =0). Another striking aspect was the insensitiveness of the certainty equivalents to 
the risk aversion coefficient, maybe a reflection of the small variability of prices and production between 
the model’s good and bad years. 
() W rr
() W rr
Available own and rented land was fully used. More than 25 ha were allocated to forage crops, the 
rest to grain (included sward establishment under-sown in barley). Manure applications per hectare were 
highest in grain and lowest in pastures. The model chose to purchase 485 tonne of conventional manure, 
applied in addition to manure from the own herd. 
 
                                                 
2 Certainty equivalent is defined as the sure sum with the same utility as the expected utility of a risky alternative (Hardaker et al., 
2004a). 
  9Table 3. Summary of optimal farm management activities in stage one. 
  Coefficient of risk aversion 
( ) z ra 0 0.000003
( ) W rr 0  4 ≈
Economic results (1000 NOK)    
Expected net income/certainty equivalent  252.8  252.2
Area payments  168.4  168.4
Land use (ha)    
Own land  25  25
Rented land  15  15
Land for grazing, 10 tonne of manure/ha  9.1  9.1
Land for silage, 20 tonne of manure/ha  16.7  16.7
Land for grain, 30 tonne of manure/ha
a  14.2 14.2
Purchase of manure (tonne)  485  485
Livestock management    
Dairy cows, 5985 kg milk/cow  19.2  19.2
Heifers 5.8  5.8
Sold female calves  3.8  3.8
Keep male calves  9.6  9.6
Milk supply (1000 litres)  100  100
Concentrates, purchased (tonne feed)  12.2  12.2
a Sward establishment under-sown in barley is included (8.6 ha). 
The milk quota was produced with 19.2 moderate yielding cows. The numbers of young stock were 
determined by the fixed replacement rate. All male calves were kept over the grazing season. 
In stage 2, the optimal plans for risk-averse farmers were very similar too those identified for risk-
neutral farmers. Table 4 illustrates main features of the tactical decisions at stage 2 for the risk-neutral 
farmer. Many of the tactical decisions were identical in all of the possible states, the numbers of livestock 
included. The main adjustment to the various crop yield states in stage 2 was to buy and sell grain and 
silage, depending on the crop yields outcomes. Available family labour not used in the farm business, was 
used off-farm. This implies that the model’s marginal value of farm labour at least equals the wage rate 
off-farm (NOK 100 per hour).  
 
Table 4. Summary of optimal farm management activities in stage two for a risk-neutral decision maker. 
  LL
a  LN LH NL NN NH HL HN HH 
Grain trade (tonne)
b  22.8 24.0 27.0 21.7 24.0 27.0 21.7 24.0 27.0
Silage trade (tonne DM)
b, c  -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 3.1 3.1
Concentrates  (tonne)  5.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Keep  bulls  9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6
Livestock paym. (1000 NOK)  152 152 152 152 152 152  152  152 152
Use of livestock shed (m
2) 197 197 197 197 197 197  197  197 197
Off-farm work (hours)  72 72 72 72 72 72  72  72 72
a LL, low forage yield and low grain yield: LN, low forage yield and normal grain yield: LH, low forage yield and high grain 
yield: … : HH, high forage yield and high grain yield. 
b A positive sign indicates sale of fodder, a negative sign purchase of fodder. 
c DM = dry matter. 
 
At the prevailing economic conditions, the main solution determinant was not the farmer’s risk 
aversion, but other factors and constraints in the organic dairy system. These results support some 
previous studies that show the cost of ignoring risk aversion may be small in short-run decision problems 
in farming (e.g., Pannell et al., 2000; Lien and Hardaker, 2001). 
  10Effects of greater farm income variability 
Norwegian dairy farmers’ incomes have been stable over recent decades, as the numbers in Table 1 
illustrate. The Norwegian, as many other countries, agricultural policies are increasingly deregulated and 
liberalised, leading to more exposure of farmers to competitive market forces. One of several effects may 
be higher instability of farm level prices and income. To illustrate farm-level effects of greater price and 
income variability we increased, compared to the present situation, the grain income variability from 
coefficient of variation (CV) 0.26 to 0.40, the dairy income variability from CV 0.6 to 0.31, and the beef 
income variability from CV 0.05 to 0.31 (cf. Table 1). Farmers’ economic consequence of this 
constructed income instability scenario, compared to the prevailing market conditions, is illustrated in 
Figure 2 with a CE-graph using SERF-analysis. 
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Figure 2. Certainty equivalents (CEs) under present economic conditions and a constructed income 
instability scenario.  ( ) z ra  in the range 0 to 0.000003 corresponds approximately to   in the range 0 
to 4. 
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The CE-graph shows the expected net income (when coefficient of risk aversion is zero) and 
certainty equivalent of net income at different degrees of risk aversion. As expected, since we for the 
activities only changed the variability of activity incomes (and not the expected incomes), compared to 
the prevailing system, a risk-neutral farmer  ( ) ( ) 0 = W rr  perceived the same utility of the net income 
under the two scenarios. However, at greater farm income variability a very risk-averse farmer 
 perceived the CE of net income considerably lower (NOK 238 000) than the risk-neutral one 
(NOK 253 000). The farmer’s degree of risk aversion in the instability scenario did also have effects on 
the optimal farm plan. Land in grain increased from 14.2 to 18.5 ha, the number of dairy cows were 
reduced from 19.2 to 16, only 83% of the milk quota was produced, more time was allocated to the risk-
free off-farm alternative, and several tactical decisions in stage 2 varied significantly between states.  
() ( 4 = W rr   )
Concluding remarks 
The objective of this paper was to present a two-stage stochastic utility efficient programming model 
with recourse applied to an organic dairy farm, and to illustrate how this model can be used in a stochastic 
dominance framework to examine farm strategies and policies under various scenarios. The model 
includes risk aversion in the decision maker’s objective function as well as both embedded and non-
embedded risk. We assumed a one-year farm plan starting in the springtime. The second-stage decisions 
allowed us to model a response to the observed crop yields outcome after harvesting in the autumn. One 
set of second-stage (recourse) variables for each of the nine states of crop yields outcome was defined, 
involving for example feed plan decisions for the indoor season.  
As an illustration of its many potential applications, the proposed model was used to analyse optimal 
farm plans for an organic dairy system in Norway. Under prevailing economic conditions we did not find 
any important shifts in resource use with increased risk aversion, and the risk-averse farmer was not 
  11worse off (measured in certainty equivalents) than the risk-neutral farmer. Other factors, such as 
production constraints and institutional constraints in (organic) farming appeared more important for the 
farm plan than the degree of risk aversion. However, in a situation with greater farm income variability, 
risk aversion may be of higher importance for the optimal plan as well as how the farmer perceives the 
utility of income.  
Future work will include more applications. For example, the EU regulation governing organic 
production will require 100% organic feed in organic dairy systems from 25 August 2005 compared with 
85% currently. The model developed can be used to assess adjustments in resource use and financial 
impacts on organic dairy herds, enabling farmers to make better-informed decisions under the new 
regulation.  
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